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After “Technical Progress and the
Aggregate Production Function”
Robert M. Solow
My never-failing source of guidance on occasions like this is a telephone
call that Paul Samuelson once made. He had agreed to be the lunch
speaker at a meeting of some business group. Talking to the organizer,
Paul asked: “Should I talk for 30 minutes?” The reply was, “Thirty minutes
would be optimal. Twenty minutes would be better.”
That 1957 paper of mine is now a little over forty years old, about the
same age as my youngest child. Like my children, it has aged well, and has
produced grandpapers. It is very nice of the organizers of this conference
to take note of it and invite me to comment on developments since then,
and perhaps still to come.
It goes without saying that a lot of eﬀort, by many hands, has gone into
whittling away at the residual. Progress is being made any time some part
of the residual can be imputed to some measurable input, or to some ad-
justment of measured output. This process began very quickly with the
work of Ed Denison, and it continues today, even at this conference. I
hardly need to mention the important advances that have been made in
this way, but they include the introduction of human capital as an explicit
input (or the adjustment of hours worked to account for the varying mix
of skills); the attempt to deﬁne and measure a stock of technological
knowledge that could be entered in a production function along with
stocks of tangible and human capital; the eﬀort to get a better measure of
the ﬂow of capital services as distinct from the mere existence of a stock
(in which connection I should mention the almost single-handed campaign
of Murray Foss to get a grip on the length of the work-week or work-year
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sources either as an input to production or as a deduction from output. I
am undoubtedly forgetting some lines of research that lead in this gen-
eral direction.
Sometimes this kind of work has to focus on measurement diﬃculties
as the main obstacle to progress. This is no trivial matter. Recent papers
by Ruth Judson and by Peter Klenow and Andres Rodriguez-Clare have
shown that alternative ways of measuring human capital can make a big-
time diﬀerence in the plausible interpretation of economic growth, so it
is really important to come to some scientiﬁc agreement on the best way
to deal with human capital as an input (and as an output, don’t forget)
and then to implement it. When comparable attention comes to be paid
to natural—including environmental—resources, similar subtleties may
arise.
Sometimes, however, this process of whittling away at the residual runs
up against obstacles that are not simply measurement problems, but are
conceptual problems or modeling problems. I want to come to one or two
of those in a few minutes, but ﬁrst I just want to mention a couple of
conceptual issues that are too complicated to discuss in a lunch talk. For
instance, there is the question of how to deal with the quality of capital
goods. I suppose that if you play fast and loose with this notion, you could
get rid of most of total factor productivity in a hurry. I think that is what
Zvi Griliches and Dale Jorgenson once proposed to do. That was too bad;
there was a lot of important stuﬀ in that paper, and some of it got hidden
behind that one minor and misguided side issue. To go very far down that
line you have to think you can identify the source of improved quality of
capital goods. And to do that you have to have greater faith than I can
muster that whoever gets to appropriate the beneﬁts of improved quality
is also the source of improved quality. I will come back to this quality-of-
capital question in a moment, in a more restricted context where it can be
dealt with clearly.
That leads directly to a broader conceptual issue that I want to mention
but don’t want to discuss seriously. In accord with the spirit of the time
in economics, there is a tendency to embed the estimation of technical
change and the aggregate production function in a general equilibrium
model, usually a very special general equilibrium model. Not only does
this ﬁt in with the spirit of the time, but it also may provide relatively easy
answers to otherwise diﬃcult speciﬁcation problems. I ﬁnd I am suspicious
of this way of proceeding.
You might say that I am partially responsible for starting that habit
forty years ago by cheerfully using observed factor shares as estimates of
elasticities. Yes; and it made me uncomfortable then. As the process goes
further, my discomfort increases. The problem is not that I am hostile to
general equilibrium theory, or even to competitive general equilibrium the-
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application then becomes a test of a very broad combined hypothesis, in-
cluding the hypothesis that the whole economy behaves as if it were do-
ing something very special. You never know how to interpret the results,
whether they are good or bad.
I think I will spend the rest of my time talking about a couple of other
conceptual issues that arise in the continuing project of analyzing produc-
tivity growth into its measurable components and the residual. The ﬁrst
is—to quote the title of a very relevant paper by Dale Jorgenson—the
embodiment question.
In the year following my 1957 paper, I wrote another paper called “In-
vestment and Technical Progress.” It was done for a conference at Stanford
and took two years to get into print, but I think it was actually written in
1958. It seemed to me then that the 1957 model might have grossly under-
stated the importance of old-fashioned capital investment as a vehicle for
bringing new technology into productive operation: No amount of clever
jet-engine technology could aﬀect productivity unless airlines bought jet
aircrafts—that sort of thing. The new paper produced a clean model in
which all new technology had to be embodied in new gross investment
before it could have any inﬂuence on production or productivity.
I liked the idea, but it went nowhere. Nobody ever suggested that it
wasn’t entirely plausible. How could they? It is plausible, common sense
even: If you don’t like the jet-engine example, how about numerically con-
trolled machine tools? (You see the connection to the quality-of-capital
problem.) The problem was not plausibility; it was that embodiment
seemed to cut no empirical ice at all, and if you couldn’t ﬁnd the embodi-
ment eﬀect leaving a signiﬁcant trace in data, then it wasn’t really so inter-
esting.
There are simple reasons why it might not show up even if it were really
there. For instance, a steady state with embodiment looks like a steady
state without embodiment; embodiment works through changes in the av-
erage age of capital equipment, and in or near a steady state the average
age of equipment will be just about constant. So, unless the rate of invest-
ment ﬂuctuates substantially, you would not see the embodiment eﬀect at
w o r k .O r ,t ol o o ki nad i ﬀerent direction, if a substantial part of new tech-
nology can be retroﬁtted to old capital at a small expense, then the em-
bodiment eﬀect can be unimportant, or it can be swamped by other inﬂu-
ences. (I have been told that a lot of chemical engineering technology is
actually designed to allow retroﬁtting.) Anyway, decades went by and em-
bodiment languished. Sad. (Ed Wolﬀ thought he saw it once, and more re-
cently Larry Lau had a sighting; it occurred to me that if it could be con-
nected to the Clinton family, Kenneth Starr would either ﬁnd it or invent
it, or at least leak it. The general impression remains: no dice.)
But now all of a sudden the whole idea has revived, under the inﬂuence
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Jovanovic-Greenwood paper this afternoon, which builds on earlier work
by Chuck Hulten, Jeremy Greenwood, Zvi Hercovitz, Per Krusell, and no
doubt others. I don’t want to spoil their story. Think of what I am about
to say as a preview of coming attractions.
Imagine a two-sector economy. In one sector capital goods are produced
by labor alone. In the other sector already accumulated capital goods (or
their services) combine with the remaining labor to produce consumer
goods. I want to tell two diﬀerent stories about this economy. In one story,
technological progress steadily reduces the labor input required to pro-
duce a unit of capital goods in the investment sector. The capital goods
don’t change at all. They enter the production function for consumer goods
in the same old way. They become cheaper relative to consumer goods as
time goes by, for obvious reasons.
The second story is more complicated. Suppose that the investment sec-
tor continues to produce “machines” with the same labor requirement as
at the beginning. You could perhaps hear that I put machines in quotation
marks, because I want to suppose that newer machines are more produc-
tive than old ones when employed in the manufacture of consumer goods.
In other words, there is capital-embodied technological progress. When I
say that it takes the same old amount of labor to produce a machine, I
must be measuring the output of machines crudely—say, by counting the
number of legs and dividing by four. It will come out all right at the end.
The output of consumer goods is calculated by imagining an eﬃcient allo-
cation of labor to machines of diﬀerent vintages, and then adding up the
output over surviving vintages. (This is the kind of model I produced in
1958.)
Now the interesting thing is that these two stories are essentially indis-
tinguishable from the macroeconomic point of view, by which I mean you
can’t tell them apart if you look only at aggregates and price indexes. You
can see why that might be so: In story number two newer machines are
more productive than older machines. In story number one that is not
literally true; but if you think of machines as congealed labor, newer
investment-sector labor is more productive (of consumer goods) than is
older investment-sector labor. Under any reasonable pricing rule, the rela-
tive price of machines will be falling in story number one because the labor
cost of producing a machine is perpetually falling, and there are constant
returns in the production of machines. In story number two, the labor cost
of producing a machine (in quotation marks) is constant, but the machines
get more productive. If you asked for the labor cost of producing a ma-
chine of constant quality, it would be falling. And it would be falling at the
rate of embodied technical progress. (Of course, if you look closely you
can see the diﬀerence between a jet and a propeller.)
The new approach talks of investment-speciﬁc technological progress,
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that society can only take advantage of technical progress to the extent
that it invests. That is what the whole idea is about, after all. And it then
becomes fairly natural to measure the rate of investment-speciﬁc technical
progress by looking at the rate at which the relative price of quality-
adjusted capital goods falls. According to this scheme the rate of invest-
ment-speciﬁc technical change has averaged close to 4 percent a year dur-
ing the postwar period. (Needless to say, this does not translate one-for-
one into output growth—not nearly.) What is even more interesting is that
there is no sign of a post-1973 slowdown in the investment-speciﬁc compo-
nent of technical change. But I will leave all this to the paper by Green-
wood and Jovanovic, which you can look forward to.
What I do want to call to your attention is that this body of research
suggests and conﬁrms the importance of two general points I have been
trying to make. The ﬁrst is the way conceptual issues and measurement
issues get intertwined. In the case of embodiment, an awful lot hangs on
our ability to estimate the price trend for quality-corrected, or productiv-
ity-corrected, capital goods. Bob Gordon’s heroic campaign to do just that
was an indispensable foundation for this new line of research. It has to be
carried forward and extended, as the Bureau of Labor Statistics is now
doing.
The second point is more worrisome: It is the way that empirical re-
search gets tied up with complex hypotheses about pricing and other as-
pects of market behavior. The idea of a dichotomy between measuring and
modeling is breaking down. This is not a remark about productivity re-
search but about economic research, and maybe about research in general.
Progress in measuring and understanding investment-speciﬁc or capital-
embodied technical change will then be tied up with diﬀerent stories about
the way the economy functions. I said that this is worrying, but it’sn o t
such a big deal. I only want to urge that research not get tied to any one
particular picture of the way the economy functions. It would be a good
idea to try out some alternative theories of factor pricing, for example, so
we can have an educated idea about how sensitive the measurement out-
come is to additional assumptions about the market environment from
which observations are presumed to arise.
I am coming to the end of the time I allowed myself. The last thing I
want to do is to throw out another pet idea and hope that it can play a
role in future research on productivity. Bits of experience and conversation
have suggested to me that it may be a mistake to think of R&D as the
only ultimate source of growth in total factor productivity. I don’t doubt
that it is the largest ultimate source. But there seems to be a lot of produc-
tivity improvement that originates in people and processes that are not
usually connected with R&D. Some of it comes from the shop ﬂoor, from
the ideas of experienced and observant production workers. This should
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nese slogan about “continuous improvement.” There is another part that
seems to originate in management practices—in design, in the choice of
product mixes, even in marketing. Notice that this is not just straightfor-
ward enhancement of productive eﬃciency. All this talk about value cre-
ation that one hears from business consultants may be more than a
buzzword; it may even be important. We need to understand much more
about how those kinds of values get reﬂected in measured real output, and
whether they can be usefully analyzed by our methods.
This is an inexhaustible subject; but patience is a scarce resource. Thank
you for yours.
178 Robert M. Solow